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NOTE AND COMMENT
there is any plausible defense of this power in the legislature it must rest on
the fact that the courts have for a long time acquiesced in such legislation,
but this seems a doubtful ground.
That the rules made by the supreme court to govern the practice and
procedure of itself and lower courts are constitutional, seems to be irrefutable,
but it is submitted that this should rest upon the ground not that the legisla-
ture is delegating a function, which belongs to itself, but rather that the
supreme court is merely exercising its proper judicial power. It is within the
judicial function of the supreme court to makes rules for the lower courts.
Dean Pound has pointed out4 that such was the nature of the English judicial
organization at the time our constitutions were adopted.
-Charles E. Carpenter.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-AMENDMENT OF SUBDIrVsIoN Or STATUT--ec. 22,
art. IV, constitution of Oregon, provides that "No act shall ever be revised
or amended by mere reference to its title, but the act revised or section amend-
ed shall be set forth and published at full length." If an act be divided into
sections and subsections, can a subsequent act amend a subsection without set-
ting out the entire section? This question has never been before the Oregon
court, but has recently been passed upon by the Appellate Court of Indiana,
see. 22, art. IV of the constitution of Oregon being identical with sec. 21, art.
IV of the constitution of Indiana.1 In the case of In re Industrial Board 2 it
was held that the entire section must be set out in the amendatory act, al-
though only one subsection was sbught to be amended.s
The case involved see. 76 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.4 The
original act was passed in 1915 and sec. 76 was divided into four subsections,
each being a definition of a term used in the act. In 1919 the legislature
amended several sections of the act, see. 76 being among them. The act of
1919 was in two sections; sec. 1, setting out the sections of the old act as
amended, and see. 2 repealing all conflicting laws. In 1923 the legislature
passed the act in question,5 containing two sections: sec. 1 amended the act of
1919 by adding a new section numbered sec. 3 to the act of 1919, and sec. 2
repealed paragraph B of sec. 76 of sec. 1 of the aot of 1919. See. 76 B was
a definition of the word 'employee.' Sec. 1 of the act of 1923, which would
4 The Regulation of Judicial Procedure by Rules of Court (1915) 10 ILL.
L. REv. 163, 172.
1 Sec. 124, BURNs ANN. IND. STAT. 1926.
2 79 Ind. App. 669, 139 N. E. 387 (1923).
8 There is a serious question as to whether or not the decision is really a
precedent. The Appellate Court in Indiana is an intermediate court of appeals.
It has held a number of times that it has no jurisdiction to decide a constitu-
tional question. The reason is that the Supreme Court of the state has been
invested with the jurisdiction to decide appeals involving constitutional ques-
tions. See Marmon Motor Car Co. v. Sparks (Ind. App.), 161 N. E. 647 (1928),
and cases there cited. The decision in question arose on a certified question
from the Industrial Board. The question of the authority of the Appellate
Court of Indiana to answer certified questions from the Industrial Board has
been raised but not decided (Martz v. Grosselli Chemical Co., 162 N. E. 737,
1928), although there would seem to be little doubt about the validity of the
procedure. See 2 R. C. L. 301-304, Sections 256-258.
4 See. 9521, BuaNs ANN. IND. STAT. 1926.
a Chap. 76, p. 244.
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be added to the act of 1919, was a new definition of 'employee,' and was an
attempt to bring within the Workmen's Compensation Act all employees al-
though illegally employed (the latter had been expressly excepted from the
prior acts). It also made provision for double compensation if the employee
were an illegally employed minor, and made provision for the payment of the
additional compensation by the employer rather than by the insurance carrier.
In the case of Langdon v. Applegate,5 it was held that under the Indiana
constitution any act which amended or revised a previous act had to set out in
full the act which was intended to be amended or revised, and also set out the
act in full as amended and revised. This case, however, was overruled in the
case of Greencastle Southern Turnpike Co. v. State where the doctrine was
announced that all that was necessary was that the act be set out in full, as
amended, and that it was not necessary to set out the first act. It was there
said that the evil aimed at by the constitution was the amending of an act by
reference to its title only. It has been held repeatedly in subsequent eases in
Indiana that all that is necessary to comply with the constitution is that the
act or section sought to be amended must be identified by reference to its title
in full and the new act or section be set out in full.8
The court in the instant case says that the new act is insufficient because
(1) several subsections of see. 1 of the act of 1919 would be materially
modified by the added section of the act of 1923, and (2) see. 2 of the act of
1923 purports to repeal clause (b) of see. 76 of see. 1 of the act of 1919 with-
out setting out see. 1 as amended.
The act of 1923 attempted to amend the Workmen's Compensation Act by
bringing within its provisions all persons legally or illegally employed by
adding a section to the act of 191.9 and repealing the conflicting clause in the
old law. The repeal and the amendment took effect simultaneously, and the
new section was in effect a supplemental act, because it did not amend any
provision of the act after the repeal of the conflicting clause. Subsection 76
(b) was a definition of the word 'employee,' and upon its repeal the Work-
men's Compensation Act was still complete and workable (though subject to
judicial interpretation on that word). The new act then certainly was to all
intents and purposes a supplemental act, and was, therefore, valid on that
ground. The court, however, without argument denies this, and the applica-
bility of McCleary v. Babcock.0
6 5 Ind. 327 (1854). In Murphy v. Salem, 49 Or. 54, 87 Pac. 532 (1906),
the act complied with the rule in this case, and it was held good.
7 28 Ind. 382 (1867). The Supreme Court of Oregon had previously re-
fused to follow Langdon v. Applegate, supra, and had established the rule in
this state on the principles announced in the last ease. See City of Portland
v. Stock, 2 Or. 69 (1863); Delay v. Chapman, 2 Or. 242 (1867); Doland v.
Barnard, 5 Or. 390 '(1875); The Barrowdale, 39 Fed. 376 (1889); Northern
Pae. Exp. Co. v. Metschan, 90 Fed. 80 (1898); Brunswick-Balke-Collander
Co. v. Evans, 228 Fed. 991 (1916). Cf. Gaston v. Thompson, 89 Or. 413, 174
Pa. 717 (1918).
8 Lingquist v. State, 153 Ind. 542, 55 N. E. 426 (1899), and casesi there
cited.
9 169 lnd. 228, 82 N. E. 453 (1907). In Elliott v. Tillamook Co., 86 Or.
427, 168 Pae. 77 (1917), there is a dictum to the effect that under the Oregon
Constitution it is impossible to amend an act by adding a section. Ia The
Glaramara, 10 Fed. 678 (1882), it was held that an act which purports to
NOTE AND COMMENT
If the act is not a supplemental act still the argument of the court to
the effect that the Workmen's Compensation Act would be modified by the
provision of the new act would most certainly seem to be without weight. The
constitution specifically allows the amendment of a section of an act, by setting
out the section as amended in full in the new act. It would be unusual if the
amendment did not affect other portions of the act or repeal them by implica
tion, but that is a question of modification and repeal and not amendment.lo
The authority cited by the Indiana court as authority for its eonclusion,"1 is
directly contrary. The Supreme Court of Indiana held in that ease that an
act which amended a section of the criminal code by reference to its complete
title and by setting out the new section in full was sufficient without regard
to its effect on existing law.
The serious question is on the court's last proposition. Can a subsection
of an act be amended without setting out the entire section in the new act?
No previous decision in Oregon or Indiana seems to have turned on this point.
The constitution says that 'the act or section amended shall be set forth and
published at full length.' There is presented a question of the proper inter-
pretation of the constitution. The constitutional provision in question was
given its present interpretation on the ground that the evil aimed at was the
amending of statutes by mere reference to the title, so that in looking up the
law one would not be forced to look at two or three acts to get the full lan-
guage of the act or section.'? The division of a section into subsections is
quite arbitrary; each subsection could well be a separate section (at least in
the present case). The same reason would seem to apply, and 'the reason being
the same, the rule is the same.' One gets a complete definition of 'employee'
in the new act without reference to the old.
It is submitted that the act was in reality a supplemental act, and good
on that theory, or that this constitutional provision should be construed to
allow the amendment of a subsection which is complete in itself, by setting
out merely the subsection as amended, and not the entire section.
-Bernard C. Gavit.
amend a prior act, and does amend it by adding a section is invalid, if the
added section is not solely supplemental, i. e., if it in fact! changes any of
the provisions of the first act. In Brown v. Silverton, 97 Or. 441, 190 Pac. 971
(1920), an act which added new sections was upheld. An act which is
really supplemental has been held good in the following cases: David v. Port-
land Water Committee, 14 Or. 98, 12 Pac. 174 (1886); Sheridan v. City of
Salem, 14 Or. 328, 12 Pac. 925 (1886); State v. Rogers, 22 Or. 348, 30 Pac.
74 (1892).
10 It has been uniformly held in Oregon that an act which impliedly re-
peals or amends a prior act is valid under the constitutional provision in
question. See City of Portland v. Stock, 2 Or. 69 (1863); Delay v. Chapman,
2 Or. 242 (1867); Bird v. County of Wasco, 3 Or. 282 (1871); Fleisehner
v. Chadwick, 5 Or. 152 (1874); Grant County v. Sels, 5 Or. 243 (1874);
Dolan v. Barnard, 5 Or. 390 (1875); Stingle v. Nevel, 9 Or. 62 (1880); Warren
v. Crosby, 24 Or. 558, 34 Pac. 661 (1893); Northern Counties Trust v. Sears,
30 Or. 388, 41 Pac. 931 (1895); Murphy v. Salem, 49 Or. 54, 87 Pac. 532
(1906); Patton v. Withyeombe, 81 Or. 210, 159 Pac. 78 (1916). Cf. Gaston
v. Thompson, 89 Or. 413, 174 Pae. 717 (1918). If it expressly repeals the
prior act it is likewise valid. Nolan v. Costello, 2 Or. 571 (1863).
11Lingquist v. State, 153 Ind. 542, 55 N. E. 426 (1899).
12 Greencastle Southern Turnpike Co. v. State, 28 Ind. 382 (1867); City
of Portland v. Stock, 2 Or. 69 (1863).
